Sneak Peek Into My Current Project (Åland)

Introduction 

Nestled between Sweden and Finland lies the Swedish-speaking archipelago of Åland, an autonomous province of Finland that has seen its fair share of Swedish, Russian, German, and Finnish control. While often overlooked or forgotten, the Åland Islands hold strategic value in the Baltic Sea’s geography. Its location at the entrance of the maritime crossroads between the Gulf of Bothnia, the Gulf of Finland, and the Baltic Sea allows Finland to hold supremacy over a vital naval route. However, unlike the Swedish island of Gotland, in which Stockholm has recently increased its military presence significantly, Åland has remained demilitarized almost uninterrupted since 1856 (Wieslander & Adamson 2023). The historical reasons for Åland’s demilitarization will be explored momentarily; however, most importantly, this article’s purpose is to explore how Russia could exploit Åland’s status as a potential loophole in NATO’s Article V: “An attack on one is an attack on all” (NATO 2023). 

With Tsarist Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, Britain and France imposed demilitarization of Russian-controlled Åland, ending almost 50 years of enhanced Russian military presence since the Swedish handed over the islands in its defeat in the Finnish War of 1809. The Åland aspect of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 remained the status quo until WW1 and its aftermath until a Swedish-then-German peacekeeping force occupied the islands during the Finnish Civil War (Ålands Fredsinstitut). Consequently, after the German surrender in November 1918, Sweden and the newly independent Finland disputed sovereignty over Åland until, in 1920, a Japanese-led League of Nations Panel sided with Finland, handing control over to Helsinki under the precondition that the islands remain demilitarized (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs). Despite a brief Finnish military presence in the early days of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of the USSR in 1941, the Åland Islands have remained demilitarized to this day.

With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a primarily Finnish-led revitalized discussion of Åland’s status has emerged. Finland’s ex-Chief of Intelligence of the General Staff, Pekka Toveri, argues, "My view is that they [historical treaties] are basically old, which do not hold well.” However, local Ålander MP Mats Löfström says that “there’s a concern that you start breaking treaties like the one from the League of Nations,”  he emphasizes that Åland’s special status could be endangered (Dougall 2023). Despite recent polls conducted by Åland’s government showing vast local support for the islands’ continued demilitarization, does the current geopolitical landscape in Europe support the immediate deployment of Finnish forces on Åland? This article outlines a way Russia could exploit this very issue. 

Key Players & Stakeholders 

Finland: With Åland being a self-governing part of Finland that under legally enforced demilitarization, defensive plans concerning Åland become increasingly difficult. If Russia were to exert control over Åland, the islands' proximity to Turku, Finland (approx. 135 km or 85 mi) and its important naval installations, would prove to be a severe headache for Alexander Stubb’s government. 

Sweden: Similar to Finland, Sweden is historically and culturally connected to the Swedish-speaking population of Åland. Naturally, Sweden is not obligated to protect Åland since it is considered Finnish territory. However, Russian control of the islands would put Russian troops dangerously close to Stockholm (approx. 160 km or 100 mi), thereby putting the Swedes in the same precarious situation as Finland. 

Russia: As the aggressor in this war game, an operation taking over Åland would be a precarious decision that would come with a significant payoff. If Russian forces were to set up an imposed presence on Åland, Moscow would have total control of a strategic maritime crossroads, creating severe militaristic, economic, and social repercussions for Finland, Sweden, and their NATO allies. 

Åland: The victim in this hypothetical scenario, the demilitarization of Åland has been the status quo for decades. However, Russia’s behavior in the past decade has persuaded the Swedish to redeploy troops to the once previously demilitarized island of Gotland (Martin 2024). With Åland’s strategic location and the evident gap it imposes in Finland’s defensive strategy, it may be time to re-approach the question of Åland’s demilitarization. 

Dimensions to Be Considered

Military: For the military mind, Åland’s strategic value is apparent. Still, its legal status provides a gaping hole in NATO’s Nordic-Baltic defense perimeter, a straw for Russia to grasp at “NATO lake.” As explored in the subsequent section, Russia could utilize Åland to monitor and disrupt the region's maritime traffic, mainly Finnish and other NATO naval assets. Due to Mariehamn’s proximity to Turku and Stockholm, modern Russian military equipment, such as drones like the Orlan-10 or other commercial drones, could be modified to deliver lethal payloads. Additionally, the Spetsnaz could likely transport portable weapons systems such as mortars, MANPADS, and electronic jammers to significantly increase their defensive capabilities against a possible Finnish or NATO response.

Economical: Åland’s contribution to the Finnish national GDP is relatively minor due to its small population and economic scale (Ålands Statistik og Utredningsbyrå 2023). However, Åland's relatively high GDP per capita, mainly due to its capital-intensive shipping industry, is significant to Finland’s economy. Moreover, Åland's heavy reliance on tourism would be a severe economic blow if geopolitical tensions arose. Even more damaging if a Russian takeover occurred, meaning that all maritime traffic in and out of Mariehamn would cease. 

Social: A Russian operation on Åland would bring severe public anxiety and deepening polarization, an additional issue that Europe cannot afford at the moment. While the Ålanders have the right to determine the islands’ future, a Russian exploitation of the islands’ legal status would likely occur before the Finnish and Ålander governments could agree on a demilitarization plan.  

The War Game: How does Russia Exploit Åland’s Demilitarization? 

Phase 1 of Russia’s potential takeover of Åland could involve a 'security crisis' that conveys aggression by NATO. Given Russia’s history of utilizing false flag operations, such as the ‘‘Finnish’’  shelling of the Russian village of Mainila as justification for the Russo-Finnish War of 1939 or the “Little Green Men” in Crimea in February 2014, a similar stunt near Ãland is not out of the realm of possibility (BBC 2022). This could involve the damaging or seizing of a Russian-flagged maritime vessel or the presentation of fake intelligence of NATO anti-Russian measures. The potential implications for NATO are significant, especially if the Finnish Coast Guard performs the forcible seizure and the hypothetical vessel is docked in Mariehamn, Åland’s main port. In this scenario, the crisis is caused by the seizure of a Russian-flagged vessel carrying goods and secret munitions, a situation that mirrors the Lusitania incident of 1915. 

Obviously, Moscow can’t simply send in a complete invasion force composed of infantry, naval, and aerial assets to take back their ship without starting WWIII. Their response will likely have to be some sort of specialized force, most probably the infamous Spetsnaz, similar to what was done in Crimea back in 2014 where Russia utilized small, mobile forces to take over an area of operation (AO). In this case the actual port of Mariehamn in a shock and awe operation (Bukkvoll 2016). If Putin’s special forces were to conduct such an operation, Moscow would put Finland into a serious legal and political limbo. Since Åland is considered Finnish territory, it is protected under NATO’s Article V. However, the islands’ demilitarization is legally quadrupled locked in various treaties, creating a challenge that Helsinki may not want to pursue since Russia could argue that Finnish military operations on Åland violate the 1920 League of Nations mandate. 

Without heavily armed Finnish troops in the area, minus the Coast Guard in Mariehamn, the Spetsnaz would face little to no resistance in taking over the harbor. Once the harbor is under Russian control, the Spetsnaz would rapidly fortify the AO, leaving little room for the Finnish to respond. Simultaneously, Russia could deploy its well-known cyber warfare forces, as conveyed in the Primakov Doctrine, often mistakenly credited to Gerasimov, to hack or severely disrupt NATO communications, hindering their response to Russia’s operation in Mariehamn (Galeotti 2019; Rumer 2019). With Russian forces controlling the port, it would give them total control of the only capable option for huge naval ships to dock in Åland, meaning that smaller naval vessels and RIB boats would remain the only plausible option for Finland to transport troops to the islands.  

With Finland blindsided, phase two of this war game kicks in; how does Finland and NATO respond to the Russian operation in Åland? Finland must decide whether it’s worth the risk to attempt to retake Mariehamn’s port from Russia. The Russians evidently will not withdraw or surrender unless they’re given something in return. The stances of other NATO members are also critical to consider here; states like Hungary and the US might favor negotiations, yet the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania might push for direct action against Russia as a ‘we told you so’ moment. Regardless of how Finland and NATO respond, Russian control of Åland would present a nightmare for NATO’s Baltic operations.

This potential threat is a stark reality, with Russia gaining an additional stronghold in the Baltic, dangerously close to the Finnish mainland and Sweden’s capital city of Stockholm. Moreover, Russia could severely limit the movement of NATO naval vessels in the area, forcing them to take long-winded routes. Lastly, with NATO members' differing stances on how to respond to Putin’s takeover of Åland, NATO cohesion and unity would be severely fractured. This might embolden Russia to test the waters again, maybe by taking over the Estonian islands of Hiiumaa and Saaermaa. With this in mind, the subsequent section lays out policy recommendations that should be implemented to deter Russia from carrying out this hypothetical crisis. These recommendations are crucial for preparedness and to ensure that NATO, especially Sweden and Finland, are prepared for this doomsday scenario. 

Policy Recommendations

1. End Åland Demilitarization: This decision is the straightforward approach to implementing a plan to defend against the hypothetical scenario presented in this article. However, as mentioned in the introduction, polls conducted by the Ålander government have indicated that the local population strongly favors continued demilitarization. Therefore, Finland and its NATO allies have to find an alternative strategy; one solution to this obstacle is the creation of a joint Finnish-Swedish Åland Rapid-Reaction Force, allowing the stationing of assets to the east and west of Åland.  

2. Åland Rapid-Reaction Force: Since Åland’s legal status prohibits the garrisoning of military forces on the island, establishing a joint rapid-reaction force is a viable alternative. With Finland's Coastal Fleet located at Pansio Naval Base in Turku, the facilities necessary to station significant naval assets are already in place (Merivoimat - Finnish Navy). Within one hour of Pansio Naval Base, the Finnish army and Air Force has local support elements with the Pori Brigade and Satakunta Air Command providing ample room for the Finnish part of the force to have combined arms capabilities. The Swedish meanwhile also have significant military resources in Stockholm due to the location of the Armed Forces HQ (https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/). 

Since Stockholm is further away from Mariehamn, the Swedish should establish a Firebase (FOB) with the Navy’s amphibious troops at either Grisslehamn or Kapellskär, two coastal villages due west of Mariehamn, to enable the Swedish to have assets in greater proximity to Åland. With the creation of a joint response force within immediate proximity of Åland, it would serve as a deterrence mechanism to any Russians plans in the area. 

3. NATO Wargaming: Finland, Sweden, and NATO also need to simulate a Russian takeover of Åland in a military exercise around the island, to ensure that the alliance is prepared for a worst case scenario like this. As mentioned in the war game, Russia will likely utilize hybrid warfare tactics, a strategy that has proven successful for them on several occasions; therefore NATO needs to continue to facilitate the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO’s hybrid warfare initiatives. 

Opportunities & Risks

Opportunities 

1. Strengthened Nordic-NATO Integration: The question of how to protect Åland could rapidly deepended Sweden and Finland’s operational planning with NATO, partially around hybrid warfare and rapid-response strategy. Lastly, the Åland scenario provides political reasoning for continued investments in the two nations’ coastal defenses. 

2. Deterrence against Russian Provocations: A visible preparation for a defensive response without violating demilitarization signals NATO’s resolve and addresses  a potential Russian strategic advantage; by wargaming a possible Åland situation, NATO will be better prepared for potential threats in the Baltic and Arctic regions. 

Risks 

1. Article V Ambiguity: Demilitrization’s legal mandate status and a Russian provocation into Åland would likely blur the threshold for NATO’s collective defense, potentially fracturing alliance cohesion. 

2. Local Resistance and Political Fallout: A change in Åland’s status without the locals’ support would face backlash, eroding democratic legitimacy and complicating Helsinki’s domestic and regional policy. 

Conclusion 

As this article conveys, Åland is not just a remote archipelago but a strategic weakness. A hypothetical Russian exploitation of Åland’s demilitarization would be disastrous for NATO unity and cohesion, especially when Trump continuously tests the alliance. While a new strategy for Åland’s defense is desperately needed, the Ålanders’ desire to remain demilitarized must be respected. However, only time will tell if Åland’s special status will survive the uncertainty looming over Europe’s geopolitical landscape or if it will falter to the strategic needs of Finland and the rest of NATO.